Abstract-The performance of distributed systems generally depend on the actions and interactions of a large number of independent components (e.g., agents, neurons). Such "collectives" are often suhject to communication restrictions, making it difficult for the components to coordinate their actions to provide good system level performance. In this article we address that coordination problem and derive four agent utility functions that make different tradeoffs between alignedness between agent and system utilities and the signal-to-noise each agent encounters. The results show that these utility functions outperform both traditional methods and previous collective-based methods by up to 75% in systems with communication restrictions.
2) does not require access to global information available through a broad communication network, i.e., agents can determine which actions are beneficial to their private utilities with the limited information at their disposal.
These issues are at odds with each other and in fact in many cases it will he impossible for the agents to achieve high values of a private utilities which is "aligned" with the world utility. ' In addition even if the world utility, computed with global information, can be broadcast to all the agents, agents may not be able to effectively use this information to select actions that will be useful to them and to the overall system. In fact many obvious methods of combining local information with the world utility can actually cause reduced performance as communication increases (Figure 1 ). This example shows the behavior of a system (described in detail in Section IV) where the world utility is plotted with respect to the percentage of agents with which an agent can communicate. Note that in some states of the system (e.g., low communication levels), increasing the amount of information to which agents have access has deleterious effects on the performance of the system. We will discuss the reasons for this paradox and show how some problems stemming from communication restrictions can be overcome by providing agents with carefully crafted private utility functions.
The first step in creating a distributed system that can effectively maximize world utility is to ensure that the agents work together. If the agents are not designed to work well with each other, they may not learn their task properly, may interfere with each other's ability to contribute to the world utility, or simply perform useless repetitive work. Hand tailoring the agents' private utility functions may offer a solution, hut generally, such systems: (i) have to be laboriously modeled; (ii) provide "brittle" global performance; (iii) are not "adaptive" to changing environments; and (iv) generally do not scale well.
To sidestep these problems, yet address the design requirements listed above (i.e., utility "alignedness" and "learnabil- ' By "aligned we mean that actions that improve the private utility of an agent will also improve the world utility. We will formalize this concept in Section It. ity") one can use the framework of collectives [18], [211. Given this framework, the crucial design problem becomes: Assuming the individual agents are able to maximize their own utility functions (w., through reinforcement learning or evolving neural networks). what set of private utilities for the individual agents will, when pursued by those agents, result in high world utility? The collectives framework has been successfully applied to multiple domains including packet routing over a data network [18] , congestion games [21] , multipleresource job scheduling over a heterogeneous computational grid [l6] , and the coordination of multi-rovers in learning sequences of actions [15] .
In this article, we extend the question of how to design the agents' private utilities given that centralized communication is not possible. Though this question has not been directly addressed, there is a large body of work on systems with low levels of communication. [3] , and that in many cases local communication is sufficient [SI. However these observations are only true in certain specific domains. In this work, we further explore this tradeoff of global coordination and local information.
In this article, we show how communication restrictions in a system can be overcome by modifying the agents' utilities. Based on the work on collectives, we derive four different agent utility functions that offer different levels of alignedness 2The design of a collective problem is related to work in many fields beyond multiagent systems, including mechanism design, reinforcement learning for adaptive control, computational ecologies. and game theory. See (171 for a detailed survey of collectives and related fields.
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and learnability for the agents' private utility functions. Furthermore, those utilities differ in whether they allow for global broadcasts of the world utility (in some domains, even though the agents will not be able to engage in realtime agent to agent communication, some global information can be broadcast at various intervals). In Section 11. we summarize the theory of collectives that is needed for this article. In Section 111. we describe the problem domain and derive the collective-based solution to this problem. In Section IV, we present and discuss the simulation results.
BACKGROUND: COLLECTIVES
In this section, we summarize the theory of collectives necessary to derive the agent utility functions used in this article. Let Z be an arbitrary vector space whose elements z give the joint move of all agents in the system (i.e., e specifies the full state of the system). The world utility G(e), is a function of the full state z, and the problem we face is to find the t that maximizes G(z). In addition to G, each agent 7 has a private utility function g,,. The agents' goals are to optimize their individual private functions, even though, we, as system designers are only concerned with the value of the world utility G. We will denote the state of agent 7 by t , , . and the state of all other than 7, by 2~~~. In this work we take z , tq, and t-,, to have the same dimensionality (e.g., for z,, all elements of 2 that are not dependent of 7 are replaced with zeros). resulting in the notation:
A. Factoredness and Learnability
For high values of G to be achieved, the private utility functions need to have two properties, which we will call factoredness and learnability. First we want the private utility functions of each agent to be aligned with respect to G, intuitively meaning that an action taken by an agent that improves its private utility also improves the world utility. Specifically, for any two states z and e' which differ only on agent 7's state, an action by agent 7 that increases g,, will also increase G. Formally a utility g,, is factored with G when:
Vz,e' s.t. 2-,, = zL, .
In game theory language, the Nash equilibria of a factored system are local maxima of G. In addition to this desirable equilibrium behavior, factored systems also automatically provide appropriate off-equilibrium incentives to the agents (an issue rarely considered in the game theory I mechanism design literature).
Second, we want the agents' private utility functions to have high learnability, intuitively meaning that an agent's utility should be sensitive to its own actions and insensitive to actions of others. As a trivial example, any system in which all the private utility functions equal G is factored 161.
However such systems often suffer from low signal-to-noise, a problem that get progressively worse as the size of the system grows. This problem happens since for large systems where G sensitively depends on all components of the system, each agent may experience difficulty discerning the effects of its actions on G. As a consequence, each rj may have difficulty achieving high g,. This signal-to-noise effect, called learnability is the second property that is crucial in the design of the agents' private utility functions. Formally we can quantify the learnability of a utility g, by:
So at a given state z , the higher the learnability, the more g,,(z) depends on the move of agent q, i.e., the better the associated signal-to-noise ratio for 0. Intuitively then, higher learnability means it is easier for q to achieve a large values of its utility. 
B. Diflerence Utilities

C. Communication Restricrions
In many real world problems the computation of the difference utility requires sufficient communication among the agents to allow the agents to infer the value of the state of the entire system. In some specific domains, using difference utilities results in many elements of the system state to cancel Consider difference utilities, which are of the form:
out, allowing the agents to compute DU without knowing the full state. However in general, an agent may not have sufficient communication to compute DU, and needs to approximate
where U, is a constant vector. If the DU for agent q depends on any component of man company, with G, the "bottom line" of the company, the zh, then r j cannot compute it directly. Instead we introduce agents q, the employees of that company. and the associated four different approximations to the DU that vary in their g,,, the employees' performance-based compensation pack-balance between learnability and factoredness. These four ages. For a "factored company", each employee's compensa-utilities are named so that the first two letters of the utility tion package contains incentives designed such that the better represent how the two terms of the difference utility deal with the bottom line of the company, the greater the employee's partial observability. " B stands for "broadcast" meaning that compensation. For example the hoard of a company wishing the world utility is broadcast to the system, "T" stands for to have the private utilities of the employees be factored with "truncated" meaning that the hidden values are ignored, and G may give stock options to the employees. The net effect of " E stands for "estimated" meaning that the hidden variable this action is to ensure that what is good for the employee is is estimated from the observed variables. Table I shows the also good for the company. In addition, if the compensation factoredness, learnability and communication level trade-offs packages have "high learnability", the employees will have a for DU and each of the four utilities presented below (e.g., relatively easy time discerning the relationship between their BEU is fully factored, has low learnability and uses local behavior and their compensation. In such a case the employees communications as well as global broadcasts, whereas EEU will both have the incentive to help the company and be is partially factored, has high learnability and only uses local able to determine how best to do so. Note that in practice, communications). providing stock options is generally more effective in small 1) Bro&cast/mmcnted utili~ (BTU): BTU is a variant of companies than in large ones. This makes perfect Sense in DU, where the communication restrictions force agent rj to set terms of the formalism, since such options generally have not only its own state, but also the states of all agents that it higher learnability in small companies than they do in large cannot observe to the null state: companies, in which each employee has a hard time seeing
how hisiher moves affect the company's stock price.
BTU,,(z)
Note that BTU, as well as BEU (discussed below), assume that the true world utility can be broadcast despite the communication restriction. In many applications, this is a assumption is reasonable since the world utility can often be computed once and broadcast throughout the environment [9] . More complex forms of broadcasting are often used for distributed multi-agent systems [SI, but in this paper we will assume a very simple global broadcast of a single number.
Despite creating a virtual state by setting more than 7 to the null state, BTU is still factored since it is in the form of the difference utility (e.g., the second term of Equation 4 does not depend on 7). However, this utility generally has significantly more noise than a pure DU since the difference removes not only q's contribution, but all states hidden from 7. Accordingly, in situations where a large number of agents are hidden from q. BTU suffers from poor signal to noise problems, e.g., at the limit of agent 7-observing only its own actions, the second term becomes G(0).
2) Truncareflruncated Utility (nil):
The second private utility is conceptually similar to BTU except that both terms are computed under the communication restrictions:
TTU,(z) = G ( z -zh*) -G(z ~ t h r t -I,,). ( 5 )
Essentially, TTU is DU where z is approximated by t -rh*r. Because of this, ?TU is not factored with respect to the world utility G(z). While not being factored with world utility, TTU generally has higher learnability than BTU pol.
Again, consider the case where a large number of agents, not interacting with 7, are hidden from 7. The contribution of those agents will not be included in either term of TTU, since both terms are computed with the communication restriction. Therefore this utility will have less noise. However, if the assumption that G ( z -t h -) is close to G ( z ) does not hold (e.g., some hidden agents are crucial to the system's behavior) then TTU will not produce good system performance.
31 Bmadcast/Estimated Utility (BEU): The third utility is similar to BTU, except that instead of truncating the components of zh.l (e.g., setting them to zero), their values are estimated given the values of z+: (6) where E[zhTlIzon] gives the expected hidden state given the states observable to 7. As long as this estimate is not influenced by the actions of q beyond z,,, this utility is factored, since the first term of the difference equation is still G(q).
While both BTU and BEU are factored, BEU may have less noise, depending on how good the estimate for zh*i is.
Again, consider a system where a large number of agents that do not interact with 7 that are bidden from 7's state, but that their values can be approximated from the visible components of the state. In this case the first term of BEU will contain the agents' contribution to G ( z ) , but the second term will subtract out their inferred contribution. Even if effects of the hidden elements cannot be perfectly estimated, significant amounts of noise can be eliminated from the system. Note however that if the estimate is particularly poor, noise can also be introduced into the system.
4) EstimatedEstimafed Urility (EEUJ:
The fourth utility is similar to TTU, except that instead of truncating the hidden elements, the value of th7( is estimated in both terms:
EEU,(z) = G(zol + E [ z h r~/ z o ,~] ) -
G(z"7 + E[zhnlzon] -t,,). (7)
Essentially, EEU is a DU where z is approximated by tori -E[zhrlIzo.]. As was the case with TTU this utility is not factored with respect to the world utility G. However, with a good estimate of zh,, the value G(zo-l -E [ z h~l l z o~] )
will be much closer to G ( t ) than G(z"*t), so this utility can be much closer to being factored with respect to G ( z ) than can TTU.
In addition this utility retains TTU's desirable property that both terms are using the same version of the state. Since both terms are estimating the values of t h * l in the same way, any contribution that the non-? terms of zh, make on the first term will be subtracted out in the second term. Note that unlike with BEU, even if the estimate of the hidden components is very poor, noise will not be added to the system since both terms of the utility use the same estimate. Instead, the quality of the estimate only affects how close this utility is to being factored with respect to G(z).
CONGESTION GAMES
Congestion games are characterized by having the world utility depend on the agents use of a particular resource (e.g., quality of an agent's action depends on the number of other agents selecting the same action) [Z], [ I l l . This type of problem arises in many domains, ranging from telecommunications (e.g., response of a link depends on the number of users), transportation (e.g., value of a highway lane depends on the number of cars), powerlcomputer grids (e.g., performance of a server depends on the number of scheduled jobs), and public g o d distribution (e.g., enjoyment of a parkhestaurant depends on the number of people using it). In each instance of the problem, at each time step, each agent 7 has to decide whether to participate (e.g., use server, drive on a lane, attend restaurant) in the use of that resource or not. The nature of the problem produces a "congestion" (e.g., if most agents believe the resource will be under-used, they will use it and cause it to he over-used, and vice-versa).
In this work, we focus on the following instantiation of the congestion game: There are N agents, each picking one out of K actions each time step. Those actions result in a world utility. G, given by: k=l where Xk(2) is the number of agents choosing action k ; zq is q's choice at that time step; and Ck is the optimal "capacity" of resource k. At the end of the time step, the associated private utilities for each agent are communicated to that agent, and the process is repeated.
Since we wish to concentrate on the effects of the utilities rather than on the algorithms that use them, we use a very simple leaming algorithm, though a number of leaming methods (e.g., neural networks, Q-learning) can be used. In this simple algorithm each agent 77 keeps a K-dimensional vector giving its estimates of the utility it would receive for choosing that action. The decisions are made using the vector, with an Egreedy l e m e r with e set to 0.05. All of the vectors are initially set to zero and there is a leaming rate decay of 0.99.
A. Communication Restrictions
We model communication restrictions in this problem by controlling how many other agents one agent can "talk" to. in BTU the first term is broadcast, the agent does not need to compute it). For utilities using an estimate of the state (BEU and EEU), z k ( t ' ' n ) is scaled, and & Z k ( Z o 7 ) represents agent 77's estimate of how many agents selected action k. Note this is an extremely simple estimation procedure and does not take any information an agent collects to modify how it forms this estimate.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We tested the performance of the four versions of the DU with varying levels of communication. The tests were conducted in a congestion game with 100 agents and with ck = 5 for all k. All of the trials were conducted for 1000 episodes, and were run 25 times. Figure 2 shows the performance of the four utilities with different levels of communication. When the communication level is high, the utilities converge to DU. When communication is very low, the BTU and BEU have the best performance because their first term, G, is not affected by the communication restriction. They essentially are reduced to a team game, and give moderately good performance. Note that the performance of BTU is worse at 50% communication than at 5%. This counterintuitive result is explained by how the utility is computed in this problem. With little communication, the total number of agents that can be seen is small, and the contribution of the second term is small. In contrast, with 50% communication, the second term will be large enough to have an impact on the utility. However, because both at 5 % and 50% communication levels x s ( z o~l )
is significantly different than .a(.), neither provides a usable second term. In fact, rather than subtracting out noise, the second term adds noise. the system performance becomes. Because this system is not factored (or in this case, not close to being factored) the agents optimizing their private utilities do not optimize the world utility. Ironically, because TTU has good leamability (i.e., the slope of TTU shows no sign of flattening out at t = 1000) the agents learn to do the wrong thing successfully. BTU and BEU on the other hand are factored so G does not decrease. However, because of learnability issues, after an initial period of improvement, the agents encounter a difficult signal to noise problem and the system performance stops improving.
;
V. DISCUSSION incurring a cost for sharing information. Furthermore we are determining the effectiveness of using the utilities as fitness evaluation functions for evolutionary computation with neural networks [I] . congestion game, one of the utilities, EEU, does significantly better than all the others. Agents using this utility learn faster and achieve better results in our experiments. Furthermore this analysis shows a tradeoff between using world utility broadcast or not. For very low levels of communication (e.g., under 10%) using the global broadcast is beneficial (e.g. BTU). For all other cases, balancing the way in which the utility is computed by using the same state estimates in both terms of the DU provides the best solutions (EEU).. 
